Abstract. Argumentation games have been proved to be a robust and flexible tool to resolve conflicts among agents. An agent can propose its explanation and its goal known as a claim, which can be refuted by other agents. The situation is more complicated when there are more than two agents playing the game. We propose a weighting mechanism for competing premises to tackle with conflicts from multiple agents in an n-person game. An agent can defend its proposal by giving a counter-argument to change the "opinion" of the majority of opposing agents. During the game, an agent can exploit the knowledge that other agents expose in order to promote and defend its main claim.
Introduction
In multi-agent systems, there are several situations requiring a group of agents to settle on common goals despite each agent's pursuit of individual goals which may conflict with other agents. To resolve the conflicts, an agent can argue to convince others about its pursued goal and provides evidence to defend its claim. This interaction can be modelled as an argumentation game [1, 2, 3] . In an argumentation game, an agent can propose an explanation for its goal (i.e., an argument), which can be rejected by counterevidence from other agents. This action can be iterated until an agent either successfully argues its proposal against other agents or drops its initial claim.
The argumentation game approach offers a robust and flexible tool to resolve conflicts by evaluating the status of arguments from agents. Dung's argumentation semantics [4] is widely recognised to establish relationships (undercut, defeated, and accepted) among arguments. The key notion for a set of arguments is whether a set of arguments is self-consistent and provides the basis to derive a conclusion.
An argumentation game is more complicated when the group has more than two agents. It is not clear how to extend existing approaches to resolve conflicts from multiple agents, especially when agents have equal weight. In this case, the problem amounts to deciding which argument has precedence over competing arguments. The main idea behind our approach is the global collective preference over individual proposals, which enables an agent to identify the key arguments and premises from opposing agents in order to generate counter-arguments. These arguments cause a majority of opposing agents to reconsider their claims, therefore, an agent has an opportunity to change "attitudes" of others.
Each of our agents is equipped with its private knowledge, background knowledge, and knowledge obtained from other agents. The background knowledge, commonly shared by the group, presents the expected behaviours of a member of the group. Any argument violating the background knowledge is not supported by the group. The knowledge about other agents, growing during the game, enables an agent to efficiently convince others about its own goal. Defeasible logic is chosen as our underlying logic for the argumentation game due to its efficiency and simplicity in representing incomplete and conflicting information. Furthermore, the logic has a powerful and flexible reasoning mechanism [5, 6] which enables our agents to flawlessly capture Dung's argumentation semantics by using two features of defeasible reasoning, namely the ambiguity propagating and ambiguity blocking. Our paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we briefly introduce notions of defeasible logic and the construction of the argumentation semantics. Section 3 introduces our n-person argumentation game framework using defeasible logic. We present firstly the external model of agents' interaction, which describes a basic procedure for an interaction between agents. Secondly, we define the internal model, which shows how an agent can deal with individual knowledge sources to propose and defend its goal against other agents. Finally, we show the justification of arguments generated by an agent during the game w.r.t. the background knowledge of the group. Section 4 provides an overview of research works related to our approach. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Background
In this section, we briefly present essential notions of defeasible logic (DL) and the construction of Dung's argumentation semantics by using two features of defeasible reasoning including ambiguity blocking and propagating.
Defeasible Logic
Following the presentation in [7] , a defeasible theory D is a triple (F, R, >) where F is a finite set of facts, R is a finite set of rules, and > is a superiority relation on R. The language of defeasible logic consists of a finite set of literals, l, and their complement ∼l.
A rule r in R is composed of an antecedent (body) A(r) and a consequent (head) C(r), where A(r) consists of a finite set of literals and C(r) contains a single literal. A(r) can be omitted from the rule if it is empty. There are three types of rules in R, namely R s (strict rules), R d (defeasible rules), and R dft (defeaters).
A conclusion derived from the theory D is a tagged literal and is categorised according to how the conclusion can be proved:
-+∆ q: q is definitely provable in D.
-−∆ q: q is definitely unprovable in D.
-+∂ q: q is defeasibly provable in D.
-−∂ q: q is defeasibly unprovable in D.
The provability is based on the concept of a derivation (or proof) in D = (F, R, >). Informally, definite conclusions can be derived from strict rules by forward chaining, while defeasible conclusions can be obtained from defeasible rules iff all possible "attacks" are rebutted due to the superiority relation or defeater rules. A derivation is a finite sequence P = (P(1), . . . , P(n)) of tagged literals satisfying proof conditions (which correspond to inference rules for each of the four kinds of conclusions). P(1..i) denotes the initial part of the sequence P of length i. In the follows, we present the proof conditions for definitely and defeasibly provable conclusions 1 :
The set of conclusions of a defeasible theory is finite 2 , and it can be computed in linear time [10] . DL can be extended by an ambiguity propagating variant [11, 5] . The superiority relation is not considered in the inference process. Inference with the ambiguity propagation introduces a new tag Σ , a positive support for a literal +Σ q is defined as:
+Σ p means p is supported by the defeasible theory and there is a monotonic chain of reasoning that would lead us to conclude p in the absence of conflicts. A literal that is defeasibly provable (+∂ ) is supported, but a literal may be supported even though it is not defeasibly provable. Thus support is a weaker notion than defeasible provability.
Argumentation Semantics
In what follows, we briefly introduce the basic notions of an argumentation system using defeasible reasoning. We also present the acceptance of an argument w.r.t. Dung's semantics. Definition 1. An argument A for a literal p based on a set of rules R is a (possibly infinite) tree with nodes labelled by literals such that the root is labelled by p and for every node with label h:
1. If b 1 , . . . , b n label the children of h then there is a rule in R with body b 1 , . . . , b n and head h. 2. If this rule is a defeater then h is the root of the argument. 3. The arcs in a proof tree are labelled by the rules used to obtain them.
DL requires a more general notion of proof tree that admits infinite trees, so that the distinction is kept between an infinite un-refuted chain of reasoning and a refuted chain. Depending on the rules used, there are different types of arguments.
-A supportive argument is a finite argument in which no defeater is used.
-A strict argument is an argument in which only strict rules are used.
-An argument that is not strict, is called defeasible Relationships between two arguments A and B are determined by literals constituting these arguments. An argument A attacks a defeasible argument B if a literal of A is the complement of a literal of B, and that literal of B is not part of a strict sub-argument of B. A set of arguments S attacks a defeasible argument B if there is an argument A in S that attacks B.
A defeasible argument A is undercut by a set of arguments S if S supports an argument B attacking a proper non-strict sub-argument of A. An argument A is undercut by S means some literals of A cannot be proven if we accept the arguments in S .
The concepts of the attack and the undercut concern only defeasible arguments and sub-arguments. A defeasible argument is assessed as valid if we can show that the premises of all arguments attacking it cannot be proved from the valid arguments in S . The concepts of provability depend on the method used by the reasoning mechanism to tackle ambiguous information. According to the features of the defeasible reasoning, we have the definition of acceptable arguments (definition 2). Definition 2. An argument A for p is acceptable w.r.t. a set of arguments S if A is finite, and 1. If reasoning with the ambiguity propagation is used: (a) A is strict, or (b) every argument attacking A is attacked by S . 2. If reasoning with the ambiguity blocking is used: (a) A is strict, or (b) every argument attacking A is undercut by S .
The status of an argument is determined by the concept of acceptance. If an argument can resist a reasonable refutation, this argument is justified. If an argument cannot overcome attacks from other arguments, this argument is rejected. We define the sets of justified arguments as follows:
Definition 3. Let D be a defeasible theory. We define J D i as follows.
n-Person Argumentation Game
In this section, we utilise the argumentation semantics presented in section 2.2 to model agents' interactions in an n-person argumentation game. Also, we propose a knowledge structure which enables an agent to construct its arguments w.r.t. knowledge from other agents as well as to select a defensive argument.
Agents' Interactions
In an argumentation game, a group of agents A shares a set of goals G and a set of external constraints T bg represented as a defeasible theory, known as a background knowledge. This knowledge provides common expectations and restrictions in A . An agent has its own view on the working environment, therefore, can autonomously pursue its own goal. In this work, we model interactions between agents to settle on goals commonly accepted by the group. Also, at each step of the game, we show how an agent can identify a goal and sub-goals for its counter arguments. This information is critical for those agents whose main claims are refuted either directly by arguments from other agents or indirectly by the combination of these arguments.
Settling on common goals. An agent can pursue a goal in the set of common goals G by proposing an explanation for its goal. The group justifies proposals from individual agents in order to identify commonly-accepted goals using a dialogue as follows:
1. Each agent broadcasts an argument for its goal. The system can be viewed as an argumentation game with n-players corresponding to the number of agents. Weighting opposite premises. In a dialogue, at each iteration, an agent is required to identify goals and sub-goals which are largely shared by other agents. This information is highly critical for agents, whose main claims are refuted either directly by other agents or collectively by the combination of arguments from others in order to effectively convince other agents. To achieve that an agent, A me , identifies a sub-group of agents, namely "opp-group", which directly or collectively attacks its main claim. A me creates Args opp as the set of opposing arguments from the opp-group and P opp as the set of premises in Args opp .
Essentially, Args opp contains arguments attacking A me 's claim. Each element of P opp is weighted by its frequency in Args opp . We define the preference over P opp as given p 1 , p 2 ∈ P opp , p 2 p 1 if the frequency of p 2 in Args opp is greater than that of p 1 . Basically, the more frequent an element q ∈ P opp is the more agents use this premise in their arguments. Therefore the refutation of q challenges other agents better than the premises having lower frequency since this refutation causes a larger number of agents to reconsider their claims.
Defending the main claim. At iteration i, Args 
The superscript of elements in P opp i
represents the frequency of a premise in Args opp i . A 3 can defend its claim by providing a counter-argument that refute ∼a -the major claim of the opp-group. Alternatively, A 3 can attack either b or c or e in the next step. An argument against e is the better selection compared with those against b or c since A 3 's refutation of e causes both A 1 and A 2 to reconsider their claims.
Attacking an argument. In this situation, individual arguments of other agents do not conflict with that of A me but the integration of these arguments does. Agent A me should argue against one of these arguments in order to convince others about its claim.
At iteration i, let the integration of arguments be T INT i = T bg |A | j=0 T i j , where T i j is the knowledge from agent j supporting agent j's claim, and JArgs INT be the set of justified arguments from integrated knowledge of other agents (See section 3.3). The set of opposite arguments is defined as:
INT and a is attacked by Args The second condition is to guarantee that A me is self-consistent and does not play any argument against itself. In order to convince other agents about its claim, A me is required to provide arguments against any premise in P opp . In fact, the order of elements in P opp offers a guideline for A me on selecting its attacking arguments.
Agent's Knowledge Structure
In this section, we present a knowledge structure which allows an agent to incorporate background knowledge and knowledge exposed by individual agents during the game. Also, we propose two simple methods to integrate knowledge sources w.r.t. ambiguity information.
Knowledge representation. Agent A me has three types of knowledge including the background knowledge T bg , its own knowledge about working environment T me , and the knowledge about others:
where T j is obtained from agent Ag j during iterations and T j is represented in DL. At iteration i, the knowledge obtained from Ag j is accumulated from previous steps:
In our framework, the knowledge of an agent can be rebutted by other agents. It is reasonable to assume that defeasible theories contain only defeasible rules and defeasible facts (defeasible rules with empty body).
Knowledge integration. To generate arguments, an agent integrates knowledge from different sources. Given ambiguous information between two sources, there are two possible methods to combine them: ambiguity blocking is selected if the preference between these sources is known; otherwise, ambiguity propagation is applied.
Ambiguity blocking integration. This method extends the standard defeasible reasoning by creating a new superiority relation from that of the knowledge sources i.e. given two sources as T sp -the superior theory, and T in -the inferior theory, we generate a new superiority relation R The integrated theory inherits the superiority relation from T bg . That means the new theory reuses the blocking mechanism from T bg .
Ambiguity propagation integration. Given two knowledge sources T 1 and T 2 , the reasoning mechanism with ambiguity propagation can directly apply to the combination of theories denoted as T INT = T 1 + T 2 . The preference between two sources is unknown, therefore, there is no method to solve conflicts between them. The supportive and opposing arguments for any premise are removed from the final set of arguments. The set of arguments obtained by this integration is denoted by Args
Argument Justification
The motivation of an agent to participate in the game is to promote its own goal. However, its claim can be refuted by different agents. To gain the acceptance of the group, at the first iteration, an agent should justify its arguments by common constraints and expectations of the group governed by the background knowledge T bg . The set of arguments justified by T bg determines arguments that an agent can play to defend its claim. In subsequent iterations, even if the proposal does not conflict with other agents, an agent should ponder knowledge from others to determine the validity of its claim. That is an agent is required a justification by collecting individual arguments from others.
Justification by background knowledge. Agent A me generates the set of arguments for its goals by combining its private knowledge T me and the background knowledge T bg . The combination is denoted as T me = T bg T me and the set of arguments is Args T me . Due to the non-monotonic nature of DL, the combination can produce arguments beyond individual knowledges. From A me 's view, this can bring more opportunities to fulfil its goals. However, A me 's arguments must be justified by the background knowledge T bg since T bg governs essential behaviours (expectations) of the group. Any attack to T bg is not supported by members of A . A me maintains the consistency with the background knowledge T bg by following procedure:
1. Create T me = T bg T me . The new defeasible theory is obtained by replicating all rules from common constraints T bg into the internal knowledge T me while maintaining the superiority of rules in T bg over that in T me . 2. Use the ambiguity blocking feature to construct the set of arguments Args T bg from T bg and the set of arguments Args T bg ={R d = {r 1 : e ⇒ c; r 2 : g, f ⇒ ∼c, r 3 :⇒ e}; >= {r 2 > r 1 }}
We have sets of arguments from the background theory and the integrated theory: .
Collective justification. During the game, A me can exploit the knowledge exposed by other agents in order to defend its main claims. Due to possible conflicts in individual proposals, an agent uses the sceptical semantics of the ambiguity propagation reasoning to retrieve the consistent knowledge. Essentially, given competing arguments an agent does not have any preference over them, therefore, these arguments will be rejected. The consistent knowledge from the others allows an agent to discover "collective wisdom" distributed among agents in order to justify its claim. The justification of collective arguments, which are generated by integrating all knowledge sources, is done by the arguments from the background knowledge Args T bg . The procedure runs as follows: JArgs T me allows A me to verify the status of its arguments for its claim JArgs T me . If arguments in JArgs T me and JArgs T me do not attack one another, A me 's claims are accepted by other agents. Any conflict between two sets shows that accepting arguments in JArgs T me stops A me to achieve its claims in next steps. The set of arguments Args opp against A me is identified as any argument in JArgs T me attacking A me 's arguments. A me also establishes P opp to select its counter-argument. It is noticed that A me is self-consistent. 
The claim of A 3 is acceptable w.r.t. arguments played by the other agents. However, the combination T bg + T me + T other shows the difference. This combination generates {⇒ g, ⇒ e, ⇒ e ⇒ f ⇒ b, ⇒ g, f ⇒ ∼c}. {⇒ g, f ⇒ ∼c} is due to the superiority relation in T bg which rebuts the claim of A 3 . Therefore, the set of opposing arguments Args opp = {⇒ g, f ⇒ ∼c} and P opp = { f 1 }. Given this information, A 3 should provide a counter-evidence to f in order to pursue c. Moreover, A 3 should not expose g to the other agents. Otherwise, A 3 has to drop its initial claim d.
Related Work
Substantial works have been done on argumentation games in the artificial intelligence and law-field. [1] introduces a dialectical model of legal argument, in the sense that arguments can be attacked with appropriate counterarguments. In the model, the factual premises are not arguable; they are treated as strict rules. [12] presents an early specification and implementation of an argumentation game based on the Toulmin argumentschema without a specified underlying logic. [13] presented the pleadings game as a normative formalization and fully implemented computational model, using conditional entailment.
Settling on a common goal among agents can be seen as a negotiation process where agents exchange information to resolve conflicts or to obtain missing information. The work in [14] provides a unified and general formal framework for the argumentationbased negotiation dialogue between two agents. The work establishes a formal connection between the status of a argument (accepted, rejected, and undecided) with an agent's actions (accept, reject, and negotiate respectively). Moreover, an agent's knowledge is evolved by accumulating arguments during interactions.
[3] presents an argumentation-based coordination, where agents can exchange arguments for their goals and plans to achieve the goals. The acceptance of an argument of an agent depends on the attitudes of this agent namely credulous, cautious, and sceptical. In [15] , agents collaborate with one another by exchanging their proposals and counter-proposals in order to reach a mutual agreement. During conversations, an agent can retrieve missing literals (regarded as sub-goals) or fulfil its goals by requesting collaboration from other agents.
We have advantages of using DL since it flawlessly captures the statuses of arguments, such as accepted, rejected, and undecided by the proof conditions of DL. The statuses are derived from the notions of +∂ , −∂ and +Σ corresponding to a positive proof, a negative proof, and a positive support of a premise. Consequently, an agent can take a suitable action either to provide more evidence or to accept an argument from others. In addition, DL provides a compact representation to accommodate new information.
Using DL to capture concepts of the argumentation game is supported by [16, 17] and recently [18, 19] . [16] focuses on persuasive dialogues for cooperative interactions among agents. It includes in the process cognitive states of agents such as knowledge and beliefs, and presents some protocols for some types of dialogues (e.g. information seeking, explanation, persuasion). [17] provides an extension of DL to include the step of the adversarial dialogue by defining a meta-program for an alternative computational algorithm for ambiguity propagating DL while the logic presented here is ambiguity blocking.
We tackle the problem of evolving knowledge of an agent during iterations, where the argument construction is an extension of [18, 19] , which define the strengthening of an argument after each step in an argumentation game. [19] differs from [18] in distinguishing participants that one participant must provide a strong argument (i.e. a definite proof) in order to defeat the other. In our work, we define the notion of collective acceptance for an argument and a method to weight arguments defending against opposing arguments by using both features of ambiguity blocking and propagating.
The works in literature did not clearly show how an agent can tackle with conflicts from multiple agents, especially when the preference over arguments is unknown. The main difference in our framework is the external model where more than two agents can argue to settle on goals commonly accepted by the group. Our weighting mechanism enables an agent to build up a preference over premises constituting opposing arguments from other agents. As a result, an agent can effectively select an argument among those justified by the group's background knowledge to challenge other agents.
We also propose the notion of collective justification to tackle the side-effect of accepting claims from individual agents. Individual arguments for these claims may not conflict with one another, but the integration of these arguments can result in conflicting with an agent's claim. This notion is efficiently deployed in our work due to the efficiency of defeasible logic in handling ambiguous information.
Conclusions
We presented an n-person argumentation game based on defeasible logic, which enables a group of more than two agents to settle on goals commonly accepted by the group. During an argumentation game, each agent can use knowledge from multiple sources including the group's constraints and expectations, other agents' knowledge, and its own knowledge in order to argue to convince other agents about its goals. The knowledge about the group's constraints and expectations plays a critical role in our framework since this knowledge provides a basis to justify new arguments non-monotonically inferred from the integration of different sources.
In this work, we propose a simple weighting mechanism, which is based on the frequency of premises in arguments attacking an agent's claim, in order to tackle the problem of conflicts from multiple agents. In the future work, we will extend this mechanism to incorporate the notion of trustful arguments from trusted agents to better select a rebuttal argument and resolve conflicts among agents.
